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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1954
will and for the determination of the validity of the provisions therein with respect to
real estate. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiffs refused
to plead further, judgment of dismissal was entered, and plaintiffs appealed. The court
held, as a matter of first impression in this state, that when a complaint is filed for a
declaratory judgment and the plaintiffs set forth facts showing the existence of an
actual controversy relating to the matter covered by the declaratory judgment act
(RCW 724.020), although not showing that the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration
of rights in accordance with their theory, a demurrer to the pleadings should be over-
ruled. See also Property at page 178.
EVIDENCE
Hearsay-An Exception to the Rule. The importance in a civil
action of the criminal record of a party or the deceased in a wrongful
death action was further enhanced by the decision in Fleming v.
Seattle.' Last year the court in Minch v. Local Union No. 370, I.U.O.E.!
went beyond the general rule that the record of conviction could be
used to impeach the witness.3 There it held that the fact of conviction,
when material without regard to the facts upon which the conviction
was based, was admissible as to the amount of damages a plaintiff
could recover for lost wages. In order to obtain employment, which
was essentially limited to federal projects in that area, the plaintiff
would have probably needed a security clearance from the F.B.I.
In the Fleming case, the defendant sought to show habitual drunken-
ness as affecting the earning power and life expectancy of the decedent
in a wrongful death action. An offer of the record of a justice court
showing eleven convictions for drunkenness, mainly on pleas of guilty,
was not accepted by the trial court which sustained an objection that
this was hearsay evidence. The defendant took exception. The jury
rendered a verdict for $55,580 which the trial judge reduced, with the
consent of the plaintiff, to $37,580. The decedent was 62 years old,
had been advised by his physician to "take it easy" because of poor
health, and had not been gainfully employed for several years. The
decedent's wife had been supporting him and their three minor sons.
While the majority opinion did not so state, Justice Olson in his dis-
sent indicates that the judgment was considered excessive. This
excessiveness would induce the court to find an error, as to the damage
question, to be prejudicial.
Thus, a dilemma faced the court. It could follow what it conceded
1145 Wash. Dec. 447, 275 P.2d 904 (1954).
2 44 Wn.2d 15, 265 P2d 286 (1953) ; noted, 29 WAsr. L. REv. 123 (1954).
0 1 Wi uoRE, EvmixcE 980 (3d ed. 1940).
1955]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
to be the strict, general rule against the admission of this hearsay
evidence, or it could take a realistic look at the problem, admit that
the evidence offered was clearly relevant, and discard the general rule
where it seemed to produce an inequity. With a frank admission that
the question had not been previously decided in this jurisdiction, and
on the strength of meager precedent from other jurisdictions' coupled
with recognition that modern writers urge an exception in this area,'
the court chose the latter alternative and reversed the judgment on
the damage issue. The justice court record, it was held, should have
been admitted as persuasive, though not conclusive, evidence.
The rule against hearsay evidence is based on the proposition that
to admit such evidence would deprive the opposition of the right to
cross-examine the source.7 The rationale of this decision seems to be
that, practically speaking, since cross-examination probably could turn
up no refutation of the inference this evidence begets, the opposition
could lose no valuable right. That being true, there no longer is reason
to exclude this probative material. The comment on the Rule in the
Model Code of Evidence, cited in the opinion, illustrates the point:
Where a person has an opportunity to defend himself and has entered a
plea of nolo contendere or not guilty or has been found guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, the judgment entered on the plea or verdict certainly
has sufficient value to be worth the consideration by a trier of fact, and
necessarily includes a finding of facts essential to the judgment in the
particular case."
There seems to the writer little danger that the court will, consider-
ing the practical approach taken, deprive the trial judge of all discre-
tion in such cases when in his opinion the admission of evidence of
prior convictions would, though relevant, be unduly prejudicial.
4 See 145 Wash. Dec. at 453, 275 P.2d at 910 where the court states: "The general
rule appears to be that a judgment of conviction is not admissible in a civil case as
evidence of the facts upon which it is based."
5 The court cited Holmberg v. Murphy, 167 Minn. 232, 208 N.W. 808 (1926);
Townsend v. Armstrong, 220 Iowa 396, 260 N.W. 17 (1935) ; and Craig v. Boston &
Maine R.R., 92 N.H. 408, 32 A2d 316 (1943). The Holmberg case, though a terse
opinion, is directly in point. There, a record of former conviction for drunkenness was
held admissible as to the damage issue in a wrongful death action. The Townsend case
indicated that an allusion to such a record, before the jury, was not error inasmuch as
the evidence should have been admitted and therefore the plaintiff could not complain.
There is nothing in the Craig case that would indicate a criminal record was offered
but merely stands for the proposition that testimony of prior convictions was material
to the damage issue in a wrongful death action.
6The court cited 5 WIGmORE, EVmENCE § 1671a (3d ed. 1940), and MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE, Rule 521 (1946).
7 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, 1368 (3d ed. 1940).
8 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 521 (1946).
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Expert Testimony-Facts Which Must Be Included In Hypo-
thetical Questions, and Facts Which May Form Basis of Answer.
Berndt v. Department of Labor & Industries,' was a proceeding to
obtain a pension under the Workman's Compensation Act on the theory
that the death of the claimant's husband from coronary thrombosis
was caused by worry resulting from fear that acute dermatitis, incurred
in the course of the husband's employment, would be considered to be
a venereal disease by the claimant, his wife. The only support of this
theory was testimony given by a medical expert who had no knowledge
of the decedent except what was included in a hypothetical question.
This was deprived of its probative value by the court mainly on the
ground that the question had omitted the fact that the claimant had
been present at the initial diagnosis of the ailment as a dermatitis
rather than as a social disease. The court expressly refused to rule on
the questions: (1) That the dermatitis was the proximate cause of
the coronary thrombosis, and (2) there was no evidence to support
the allegation of apprehension of the decedent as the testimony of the
claimant on this point was hearsay as to a purely subjective matter.
The court stated the general rule:
Although hypothetical questions propounded to medical experts need not
always include all undisputed facts, any undisputed fact which is material
and important in the formation of a fair, intelligent and sound opinion
should be included.10
The court did not like the controversy. It referred to it as "not just
another heart case" and indicated that no court had been asked to go
"so far" as claimant urged. It is submitted, however, that in its act of
conclisively suppressing the action by affirming the trial court's grant
of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it might have misapplied the
rule. It is true that the fact of the claimant's knowing of the diagnosis
is undisputed, but is it not ultimately the fact of the husband's appre-
hension which is in dispute? So long as the court is willing to allow
the testimony of the claimant on this issue there is evidence to support
the theory that the decedent was so worried; only the fact that he
might not have reasonable cause to worry can be established by show-
ing he was aware that she had heard the diagnosis. Must the claimant
present to the expert this issue to decide along with the request for an
interpretation of the general hypothesis given him?
9 44 Wn2d 138, 265 P2d 1037 (1954).
10 Id. at 144, 265 P2d at 1043.
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There was no mention of the case of State v. Underwood where it
was stated:
We think the rule is fairly well settled that, where the facts are in dispute,
it is sufficient if a hypothetical question fairly states such facts as present
the examiner's theory of the case.'2
The court then went on to say that it was the duty of the jury to
decide whether the facts as stated in the hypothetical question were
true. This might therefore still be regarded as the general rule for
disputed facts. The rule that material facts may not be omitted is
directed at the tendency of counsel to fail to establish a complete
"hypothesis" for the conclusion he wishes to obtain from the expert.'
This "hypothesis" must, of course, be reasonably close to the case at
hand in order for the jury to gain any advantage from the expert inter-
pretation." The meaning of the word "material" then might be material
to the establishment of a logical and complete fact basis for the con-
clusion, and not material as in considering admissibility. Otherwise,
as in the present case, the result of the ruling is to force the examiner
to include conflicting evidence in his hypothetical questions and force
the expert to comment upon that evidence. Alternative fact situations
may be presented to the expert on cross-examination and his opinion
on the opponent's theory obtained. This is the normal method for
allowing the jury to decide the disputed issues of fact and yet enlist the
aid of experts to interpret these facts for them when they are not
qualified to do so.
The remaining fault the court found with the answer of the expert
in this case was that he had assumed the additional grounds of financial
worry and pre-existing coronary condition as a basis for his answer.
This was drawn out on cross-examination. Though from the question
which stated the decedent had been away from work for about seven
11 35 Wash. 558, 77 Pac. 863 (1904). This case was cited in 56 Wash. 47, 105 Pac.
149 (1909), and 112 Wash. 560, 192 Pac. 950 (1920), as explanatory of the rule on
hypothetical questions. It has not been overruled.
12 35 Wash. at 561, 77 Pac. at 866.
13 Bozman v. State, 177 Md. 151, 9 A.2d 60 (1939). The court stated in 9 A.2d at p.
62, regarding a question with reference to the distance a car could be stopped: "The
question should have stated the condition of the tires on the car, the grade of the road,
the condition of the concrete surface of the road, and any other factors which might
have been material to the conclusion. It is well settled in this State that a hypothetical
question must embrace every material element of the hypothesis founded upon the
evidence, and a hypothetical question omitting any vital or essential fact testified to is
properly disallowed." See also: Tugman v. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills,
144 Va. 473, 123 S.E. 179 (1926); Mathisen Alkali Works v. Redden, 177 Md. 560,
10 A.2d 699 (1940) ; and Starr v. Oriole Cafeterias, Inc., 182 Md. 214, 34 A.2d 335(1943). The above three cases were the authority cited for the rule in the Berndt case.
"4 Griffith v. Thrall, 109 Ind. App. 141, 29 S.E2d 345 (1940).
[M"Y
WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1954
weeks, some financial worry might be inferred, and a diseased coronary
artery might be a medical conclusion of the expert, the court is follow-
ing the general rule that the whole basis for the conclusion must be
found in the hypothetical question in such an instance."5 This should
illustrate the need for apprising the expert of the pitfalls of cross-
examination, and the need for careful phrasing of the question.
Judicial Notice-Useful Life of Structure According to Internal
Revenue Bulletin. McFerran v. Heroux18 involved an action for dam-
ages for the breach of a covenant by a lessee of real property; the
subject matter of the litigation was a grandstand, which was deemed-
as between the parties-to be the personal property of lessee. The
wooden grandstand burned to the ground and the defendants, the lessee
and his assigns, were held in the trial court to have breached a covenant
to rebuild. (The lessor had an option to purchase the grandstand for a
stated small sum at the termination of the lease.) Because the plaintiff
had offered no evidence as to the value of the grandstand at the time
the option was to be exercised, the trial court awarded $1.00 damages
to plaintiff. On appeal the supreme court cited for the first time the
Model Code of Evidence, Rule 802,7 as its general authority-for taking
judicial notice of an Internal Revenue Bulletin,18 which set the life of
a wooden grandstand at 15 years. On the basis of this the court changed
the judgment to one for over $64,000, jointly and severally against all
defendants.
While probably considering their decision in accordance with the
equities of the case in that the trial disclosed the lessee-defendant had
recovered about $60,000 from fire insurance, it is submitted that the
court misunderstood and misapplied the rule they used. Assuming
that the court is correct in using the Model Code, which does not pur-
port to be a restatement of existing law, but a revision and statement
of what the writers 9 think it should be, the court acted contrary to the
Code when they arbitrarily applied Rule 802 without informing the
15 2 WiGmoRE, EviENmcE § 672 (3d ed. 1940).
10 44 Wn.2d. 631, 269 P2d 815 (1954). See also Property at page 175.
1 7 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 802 (1942).
18 U. S. Treasury Department Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bulletin "F" (Rev.
1942), Income Tax Depreciation Obsolescence Estimated Average Useful Lives and
Depreciation Rates, 2 CCH Fed. Tax Rep. § 1776.
29 The introduction to the Code by Wm. Draper Lewis, Director of the American
Law Institute, admits that some of the Code's provisions are controversial and states
that because of the confused state of the law of evidence the attempt to write a re-
statement was abandoned and a revision undertaken. Though Professor Wigmore, as
Chief Consultant, did not agree with the Code form, Mr. Lewis indicates that the
substantive rules are substantially in accord with the Wigmore viewpoint.
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parties of "the tenor of the matter to be judicially noticed and affording
them reasonable opportunity to present [the court] information rele-
vant to the propriety of taking such notice."" Until publication of the
opinion, neither of the parties nor the court had mentioned judicial
notice; the respondent was offered no opportunity to be heard.
It would also seem arguable that the Bulletin resorted to was not
proper subject of judicial notice. The court quoted Rule 802: "The
judge may of his own motion take judicial notice of . . . (b) specific
facts so notorious as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute, and
(c) specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge which are
capable of immediate and accurate demonstrations by resort to easily
accessible sources of indisputable accuracy. . .. "" The Bulletin itself,
however, after indicating in the first paragraph that the data therein
is merely the "trend and tendency of official opinion," cautions in the
second paragraph:
Taxpayers and officers of the Bureau are cautioned against reaching
conclusions in any case solely on information contained herein and should
base their judgment on the application of all pertinent provisions of the
law regulations, and other Treasury Decisions to all the facts in any par-
ticular case. They are set forth solely as a guide or starting point from
which correct rates may be determined in the light of the experience of
the property under consideration and all other pertinent evidence. 22
Yet the court proceeded from a condition of no evidence on the
depreciation rate to an established rate of 15 years, based on the
Bulletin alone.
As specific authority for including the Bulletin the court said:
"Within the scope of subparagraph (c) of the Model Code of Evidence,
supra, this court has on numerous occasions taken judicial notice of
standard mortality tables . .,2. Professor Wigmore has deemed the
taking of "judicial notice" of mortality tables a misnomer" and
suggests that these are admissible when offered as evidence, though
hearsay, under an exception he calls "Learned Treatises."2 It is
20 MODEL CODE OF EViDENCE, Rule 804 (1942). See also, Rule 806(4) and comment
thereon.
21 The examples given in the comment on subparagraph (c) are: (1) Properjudicial notice that an ordinary auto could not negotiate a 95 degree turn at 45-50 miles
per hour without mishap, and (2) a showing of divided opinion on judicially noticing
that the period of gestation sometimes exceeds 300 days.
22 Supra note 18.
22 The cases cited for this were: Cox v. Poison Logging Co., 18 Wn.2d 49, 138 P.2d
169 (1943) ; Piland v. Yakima Motor Coach Co., 162 Wash. 456, 298 Pac. 419 (1931) ;
Roalsen v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 147 Wash. 672, 267 Pac. 433 (1929) ; and Heath v.
Stephens, 144 Wash. 440, 258 Pac. 321 (1927).
24 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2566(4) (3d ed. 1940).
25 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1690-1700 (3d ed. 1940), and note especially § 1698.
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significant that Professor Wigmore was the Chief Consultant in the
drafting of the Code and the Code contains Section 529 entitled
"Learned Treatises." Even our court has refused to treat the mortality
tables as final determination of life expectancy, but only as some evi-
dence to which may be added the state of health, occupation, etc., of
the person whose expectancy is being determined." It would seem
then, that if the Bulletin were admissible at all, it would be limited in
effect to some indication of the depreciation rate, and considering the
caveat therein, not enough to finally determine that rate.
While there is a division of opinion on whether it is proper for an
appellate court to take judicial notice of a fact overlooked by the trial
judgeF it is universally held that new evidence may not be introduced
at that level. By introducing the Internal Revenue Bulletin of their
own motion, it is submitted that the court not only took judicial notice,
without apprising the parties, of an item not the proper subject thereof,
but in effect introduced evidence into the appeal.
JoHN F. KovAmK
LABOR LAW
Effect of Arbitration Agreements. The uncertainty created by the
1947 amendment to § 1 of the Washington Arbitration Act of 19431
was partially dispelled by the case of Greyhound Corporation v.
Amalgamated Association of Street, etc., Employees.'
The action arose under a non-statutory arbitration provision con-
tained in a collective bargaining agreement between Greyhound and
the Union. The Union had objected to changes in the duties of certain
of the bus drivers in the employ of Greyhound and demanded that the
ensuing dispute be submitted to arbitration. Greyhound declined to
arbitrate, sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that no arbitrable
issue existed between the parties. The Union demurred to Greyhound's
26 In Roalsen v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., note 8 .supra at 675, 267 Pac. at 436, the
court said, "It is true that the effect of such (mortality) tables is for the trier of facts,
and true also that such triers, in determining life expectancy of any person, may take
into consideration his vocation, occupation, and condition of health, both mentally and
bodily, and may find that these considerations destroy the value of the tables as evi-
dence; they are not inadmissible for that reason." It is notable that this is one of the
cases the court relied upon as authority for the judicial notice taken in the Heroux Case.
27 The Model Code of Evidence supports the proposition, see Rule 806; some
authorities hold to the contrary. See Line v. Line, 119 Md. 403, 86 Atl. 1032 (1926).
At any rate the assumption of a fact should not be treated as preventing opposing
counsel from attacking the assumption. See 9 WIGmORE, EvENc E § 2567 (3d ed. 1940).
'Laws 1947 c. 209 § 1; RCW 7.04.010.
244 Wn2d 808, 271 P2d 689 (1954).
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